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THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS) AS 
DRAFTED: NICE IDEA, POOR EXECUTION
*
 
 
Thomas Pogge 
†
 & Mitu Sengupta 
†
 
Abstract: The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is scheduled to adopt 
its 2015-2030 development agenda in September 2015: the Sustainable Development 
Goals.  The United Nations Open Working Group (OWG) on the SDGs set a draft of this 
agenda before the UNGA in September 2014.  Despite clear positives, this draft fails to 
take advantage of the SDGs’ non-binding and aspirational nature to encourage global 
leaders to set aside short-term gain in order to invest in a sustainable future.  Specifically, 
the draft ought to identify actors responsible for specific achievements, to envision 
structural reforms in the global institutional order, to provide for objective and precise 
progress measurement, and to include stronger human rights language.  In addition, 
particular goals and their means of implementation should be redrafted or strengthened to 
ensure that they project their full moral force and appeal.  A better pact is possible; the 
UNGA must adopt goals reflecting a genuine commitment to a livable future for all. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”), to be adopted in 2015 
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as part of its development 
agenda,
1
 are meant to guide global development efforts over the next fifteen 
years, between 2015 and 2030.  They replace the Millennium Development 
Goals (“MDGs”), which held sway during 2000 to 2015.
2
  In order to forge a 
widely acceptable formulation of the SDGs, the UNGA instituted the Open 
Working Group (“OWG”) in January 2013.
3
  This group completed its 
mandate by publishing a draft text with seventeen goals and 169 targets, 
which was placed before the UNGA in September 2014 to serve as the basis 
for intergovernmental negotiations leading up to the September 2015 summit 
for the adoption of the post-2015 UN development agenda.
4
 
                                                     
*
 This essay is based on an analysis of the SDG draft that the authors composed for Academics 
Stand Against Poverty (“ASAP”) (www.academicsstand.org). We are grateful to Washington International 
Law Journal for making our critical thoughts available to a broader audience.  
†
 Thomas Pogge is Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. 
†
 Mitu Sengupta is Associate Professor of Politics at Ryerson University.  
1
 United Nations Summit to adopt the post-2015 development agenda, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/summit (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
2
 See Background to the Millennium Development Goals, THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
3
 Introduction to the Open Working Group, THE UNITED NATIONS, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/owg.html (last visited Feb. 7 2015). 
4
 See THE OPEN WORKING GROUP, OPEN WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL FOR THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS, available at 
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Like the MDGs, the SDGs are to be a statement of aspirations, and a 
voluntary agreement rather than a binding treaty.
5
  This is a disadvantage as 
far as the prospects for compliance are concerned.  But it is also an 
opportunity.  When no legally binding obligations are at stake, states may be 
willing to adopt an agenda that is more ambitious in scope and vision.  And 
formulating such a common vision for 2030 can raise the gaze of politicians 
and officials beyond short-term political advantage or narrowly defined 
national interest and can lead them to think imaginatively about that 
cosmopolis of the future whose foundations are now being shaped in this 
early stage of globalization. 
Despite some clear positives, however, the draft fails to take 
advantage of its position as a non-binding statement of aspirations.  It does 
not fulfill its self-proclaimed purpose of inspiring and guiding a concerted 
international effort toward global development and the eradication of severe 
poverty.  This article argues that changes should be made to embolden the 
SDGs’ moral power and appeal.  Part II of this article reviews how the draft 
generally falls short of its potential by failing to indicate what each goal 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1579SDGs%20Proposal.pdf [hereinafter OPEN 
WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL].  The OWG’s proposed goals are: 
Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere  
Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture  
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages  
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities 
for all  
Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls  
Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all  
Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all  
Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all  
Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster 
innovation  
Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries  
Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable  
Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns  
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts 
Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development  
Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage 
forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss  
Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels  
Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable 
development.  
5
 See Description of the Rio+20’s Mandate for the Sustainable Development Goals, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015). 
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demands from various competent actors, by failing to call for transformative 
change in the international institutional order, by failing to include stronger 
human rights language and by failing to provide objective and precise 
measures to track progress.  Part III reviews some specific goals and 
recommends how they should be redrafted to ensure performance and 
concrete results.  Redrafting the SDGs would help the goals attain moral 
force and appeal, inspiring national leaders and multinational organizations 
to think broadly and creatively about the global future. 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS GENERALLY 
In this part we will show how the SDGs can be further improved by 
clarifying burdens of performance, prioritizing structural reforms of the 
global institutional order, and including stronger human rights language. 
 
A. The New Goals Should Clarify Specifically Who Will Bear What 
Burdens of Execution; They Should Clearly Specify the 
Responsibilities of Competent Agents. 
 
Accountability is the key to effective development goals.
6
  While the 
SDGs include goal-specific means of implementation (“MOI”),
7
 they fail to 
specify who is responsible for each proposed goal and who is supposed to do 
what to get each goal accomplished.  Without detailing such specific 
responsibilities, the proposed SDGs leave too much of the work to the 
poorer countries and remain a mere wish list with little moral force.
8
 
For example, Target 5.1—“End all forms of discrimination against all 
women and girls everywhere”—fails to identify to whom this instruction is 
directed.  It fails to specify or to distinguish among the efforts required from 
states acting domestically, states acting beyond their own borders, and 
multinational enterprises.  Similarly, Target 2.1—“By 2030, end hunger and 
ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable 
situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year 
                                                     
6
 See generally United Nations Human Rights, Who Will be Accountable?  Human Rights and the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WhoWillBeAccountable.pdf. 
7
 For a review of some of the discussion involved in developing these MOI, see OWG on SDGs 
discusses Means of Implementation, UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, http://www.un-
ngls.org/spip.php?page=article_s&id_article=4383 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
8
 “Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals has been hampered by 
the ad hoc and voluntary character of their information disclosure, monitoring and reporting mechanisms.” 
United Nations Human Rights, supra note 6. 
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round”—also fails to formulate and to specify responsibilities.  Without 
holding particular actors accountable, the most capable agents best placed to 
advance the objective will also be the parties best able to divert attention 
away from themselves.
9
  As a result, the poorest nations might be blamed for 
failing to reduce their hunger rate down from 60 percent to 30 percent, for 
example, while an upper-middle-income country prides itself on having 
accomplished the much less demanding task of reducing its hunger rate from 
0.6 percent to 0.3 percent. 
This kind of inequitable allocation of burdens and blame is precisely 
what happened with the MDGs, where the poorest countries were blamed for 
not reducing their huge deprivation rates fast enough.
10
  If repeated, this 
deficiency stands to undermine the moral authority and success of the new 
agenda. 
 
B. The SDGs Should Call for Structural Reforms of the Global 
Institutional Order. 
 
The OWG draft contains only a few passing references to institutional 
reforms that could diminish the headwinds facing the poor, although such 
reforms are crucial for the achievement of every goal.  The draft thus misses 
a crucial opportunity to question and reform such unjust arrangements.  
Official and non-governmental development assistance can indeed 
substantially improve the trends in global poverty and income inequality
11
; 
but they cannot fully neutralize the centrifugal tendencies produced by the 
ordinary operation of the world economy as presently structured. 
For example, the draft says little about illicit financial flows, which 
are known to aggravate oppression and poverty worldwide and which dwarf 
the flow of international development assistance.
12
  An earlier version of the 
                                                     
9
 “The absence of clearly defined duties and responsibilities has made it easier for Governments and 
other actors to abdicate responsibility and blame others for underperformance.”  Id. at 4. 
10
 See, e.g., Matthew Clarke & Simon Feeny, Old Challenges and New Opportunities for the MDGs: 
Now and Beyond 2015, 16 J. ASIA PACIFIC ECON. 509, 512-13 (2011); see also William Easterly, How the 
Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa, 37 WORLD DEV. 26, 26 (2009); Mac Darrow, The 
Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights Priorities for the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 55, 65-66 (2012). 
11
 See generally IAN GOLDIN, HALSEY ROGERS, & NICHOLAS STERN, WORLD BANK, THE ROLE AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: LESSONS FROM THE WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE (2002), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/roleofdevelopment.pdf. 
12
 The relevant Target 16.4 is quite vague and general: “By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial 
and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized 
crime.” OPEN WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL, supra note 4.  On the great importance of the problem, see 
Illicit Financial Flows, GLOBAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, 
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OWG draft had included a stand-alone target for global cooperation to 
reduce international tax dodging,
13
 but this target was drastically cut back in 
the final revision of the draft, which now only calls broadly for a reduction 
in “illicit financial and arms flows” (Target 16.4) and for cooperation toward 
improving poor countries’ capacity for tax and revenue collection (Target 
17.1).  The draft does not specify who is supposed to reduce those flows and 
who is supposed to engage in this cooperation. 
Any serious attempt to render our financial system less conducive to 
illicit financial flows must insist on stand-alone targets that name 
responsible agents and specify their tasks.  The SDGs should call on 
governments to mandate i) disclosure of the ultimate beneficial owners of 
companies and the controlling parties of trusts and foundations, ii) public 
country-by-country reporting of profits and other tax-relevant information 
by multinational enterprises,
14
 iii) automatic exchange of tax-relevant 
financial information by national tax authorities worldwide, iv) public 
reporting on funds paid to governments for the extraction of natural 
resources and on the use of those funds, and v) tough sanctions, including 
jail time, for professionals who facilitate illicit financial flows, such as 
senior officers from global banks, accounting firms, law firms, insurance 
companies, and hedge funds.  In addition, the SDGs should call on 
governments to commit to vi) harmonizing anti-money laundering 
regulations internationally and vii) carrying out clear, reliable, frequent and 
timely public fiscal reporting, as well as opening up their fiscal policy-
making process to public participation.
15
 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globaljustice/DirtyMoney.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); see also AFRICA 
RENEWAL, Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: track it, stop it, get it, 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/illicit-financial-flows-africa-track-it-stop-it-get-
it (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
13
 See MAJOR GROUPS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS INCLUDING CITIZENS’ RESPONSES TO MY 
WORLD 6 PRIORITIES, FINAL COMPILATION OF AMENDMENTS TO GOALS AND TARGETS 24 (July 2014), 
available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4438mgscompilationowg13.pdf 
[hereinafter FINAL COMPILATION OF AMENDMENTS TO GOALS AND TARGETS]. 
14
 See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Progress Report of the High-Level Panel 
on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, U.N. Doc E/ECA/CM/47/6 (Mar. 3, 2014) 8 (2014), available 
at http://www.taxjusticeafrica.net/sites/default/files/Progress%20report%20of%20the%20High-
level%20Panel%20on%20IFFs%20-%20March%202014%20(1).pdf. 
15
 These were among the leading demands that emerged from a crowd-funded Delphi study that 
ASAP completed with a panel of twenty-six leading experts.  See Policy Options for Addressing Illicit 
Financial Flows: Results from a Delphi Study, ACADEMICS STAND AGAINST POVERTY (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://academicsstand.org/2014/09/policy-options-for-addressing-illicit-financial-flows-results-from-a-
delphi-study/.  See generally THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE 
(IBAHRI) TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS, POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, TAX ABUSES, 
POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Human_Rights_Institute/TaskForce_IllicitFinancialFlows_Poverty_HumanRights.as
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Structural reform is also the best way of solving the problem of 
heavily indebted countries.  The populations of many poor countries are 
burdened by large debts accumulated by their rulers for purposes that were 
not approved by or beneficial to the country’s population.  Rather than 
merely help such populations cope with their unsustainable debt burdens, we 
ought to change the rules so that such loans are recognized and enforced as 
genuine national obligations only if the borrowing government was 
recognized, at the time the loan was made, as legitimately representative of 
the country’s people.  Lenders and their home countries should not be 
allowed to exert pressure on countries to service debts incurred by previous 
rulers who were not so recognized.
16
 
 
 
C. The New Development Agenda Should Include Strong Human Rights 
Language. 
 
The new agenda does not emphasize the imperative to respect, protect, 
and fulfill human rights, nor recognize their universality, indivisibility, and 
interdependence.
17
  Given that the SDGs are non-binding and aspirational in 
nature, it should not be too hard to get governments to agree to include 
strong, human rights-affirming language.
18
 
One problem of the SDG draft is that basic rights that could have been 
characterized as human rights are not characterized as such.  Thus, access to 
water, sanitation, and food,
19
 as included in Goals 2 and 6, are not framed as 
human rights.  And, contrary to the aspirations of women’s groups 
worldwide, Goal 5—the gender equality goal—does not identify the 
                                                                                                                                                              
px; see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS 
FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEASURING OECD RESPONSES (2014), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries.pdf; Illicit Financial 
Flows, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/illicit-financial-flows/ (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015). 
16
 For more on how to institutionally constrain the international borrowing privilege, see THOMAS 
POGGE, WORLD POVERTY: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 63-68 (2008). 
17
 See Liz Ford, Mary Robinson: Climate, human rights key to new development goals, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/26/climate-
change-human-rights-development-goals; see also Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/MDG/Pages/MDGPost2015Agenda.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
18
 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 64. 
19
 The right to food is a human right codified in The International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Political Rights, Art. 11, and there is a United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food.  See 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
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empowerment of women and girls as a human rights issue.
20
  Furthermore, 
important goals are not framed in universal terms, but in terms of what is 
“nationally appropriate.”  For example, rather than demand universal social 
protection floors for Goal 1, to “[e]nd poverty in all its forms everywhere,” 
proposed Target 1.3 calls for “nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors.” 
It is perhaps understandable that strong human rights language and a 
universal or zero target approach for all minimum core economic and social 
rights obligations have been carefully avoided in the formulation of the new 
goals.  At various sessions of the OWG, developing countries, concerned 
that they would not be able to meet the burden of “zero goals”, argued for 
the inclusion of nationally-determinable targets and language on respecting 
national policy space (Target 17.15).
21
  This is a legitimate worry, as “zero 
goals” could be used to name, shame, and blame them.  However, the 
solution is not to dilute the SDGs by aiming for whatever is feasible with 
national resources.  Instead, the SDGs should specify the responsibilities of 
wealthy countries and enterprises in relation to these goals and should 
identify what they must do to reduce impediments and to increase assistance 
so that human rights can be realized even in the poorest countries. 
 
D. To Ensure Honest and Meaningful Measurement of Progress, 
Definitions and Methods Must be Precisely Specified and Locked in in 
Advance, and Tracking Must be Entrusted to an International Group 
of Reliable Independent Experts Rather than to Politically Exposed 
Intergovernmental Agencies. 
 
The new agenda will be worth very little without reliable measures of 
progress toward the objectives.  While poverty may indeed have declined in 
                                                     
20
 “The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part 
of universal human rights.  The full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social 
and cultural life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of 
discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international community.”  World 
Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶18, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).  “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination 
in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.”  Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, ¶7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 20378 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
21
 See, e.g., Bhumika Muchhala, United Nations: Varying Visions and Priorities at SDG Working 
Group, SOUTH-NORTH DEVELOPMENT MONITOR (SUNS) 7548, Mar. 19, 2013, available at 
http://www.twn.my/title2/unsd/2013/unsd130302.htm. 
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the last twenty-five years,
22
 the trend depends heavily on the definitions and 
methods used for measurement, and the actual decline in impoverishment 
around the world is more suspect.
23
  For example, the World Bank has 
defined poverty ever more narrowly by replacing the original purchasing 
power parity threshold of USD 1.00 per person per day in 1985 US dollars 
(as referenced in the UN Millennium Declaration and in MDG-1) with a 
lower threshold of USD 1.08 per person per day in 1993 US dollars and then 
with an even lower threshold of USD 1.25 person per day in 2005 US 
dollars.
24
  This has led to a much steeper decline in official poverty, as can 
be seen from the World Bank’s own trend numbers for different poverty 
lines.
25
  Defining poverty in terms of daily expenditure with the absurdly 
low purchasing power of USD 1.25, the Bank calculates that poverty has 
fallen by 61 percent: from 43.45 percent of the population of the developing 
countries in 1990 to 16.99 percent in 2011.
26
  Had the Bank chosen a more 
adequate poverty line reflecting daily purchasing power of USD 3.00, it 
would find that poverty has fallen by less than 31 percent: from 76.29 
percent in 1990 to 52.80 percent in 2011.
27
 
Wide discretion is also enjoyed by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (“FAO”), which in 2012 has managed to transform a steadily 
rising undernourishment trend into a steadily falling one by introducing an 
“improved methodology,” which counts as undernourished only those whose 
caloric intake is “inadequate to cover even minimum needs for a sedentary 
lifestyle” for “over a year.”
28
  This definition of the undernourished excludes 
those who suffer other nutritional deficits (protein, vitamins, minerals and 
                                                     
22
 Press Release, World Bank, Remarkable Declines in Global Poverty but Major Challenges 
Remain (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/remarkable-
declines-in-global-poverty-but-major-challenges-remain. 
23
 For the sobering assessment of one co-architect of the MDGs, see Jan Vandemoortele, On 
Irrational Exuberance about MDG Progress (2002), 
http://www.beyond2015.org/sites/default/files/On%20irrational%20exuberance%20about%20MDG%20pr
ogress.pdf. 
24
 See THOMAS POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC 65-68 
(2010). 
25
 See the World Bank’s poverty website, PovcalNet, WORLD BANK, 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
26
 See World Bank’s Regional Aggregation, PovcalNet, WORLD BANK, 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
27
 See Id.  For more extensive discussions, see POGGE, supra note 24, at 63-68, and Thomas Pogge, 
Poverty, Hunger and Cosmetic Progress, in THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 209 (Malcolm Langford, Andy Sumner, & Alicia Ely Yamin, eds., 2013). 
28
 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2012: 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IS NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT TO ACCELERATE REDUCTION OF HUNGER AND 
MALNUTRITION, 50 (2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf.  
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other micronutrients)
29
 and those who are not adequately nourished by the 
sedentary diet because they must do serious physical work in their home or 
for a living.  Opportunities for these kinds of midway methodological 
revisions with the benefit of hindsight invite abuse and distrust.  Such 
opportunities divert efforts toward achieving merely cosmetic progress and 
undermine the credibility and moral authority of UN goals and UN agencies.  
In order to ensure that progress made towards the SDGs remains 
credible, definitions and measurement methods must be locked in for the full 
fifteen-year period that the SDGs are meant to govern.  Additionally, the 
measurement of progress should not be entrusted to organizations that are 
politically exposed or motivated,
30
 like the FAO or the World Bank, both of 
which are run by government appointees and depend on governments’ good 
will and funding.  Instead, progress should be tracked by an independent 
agency—for example an international group of independent high-level 
academic experts. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING SPECIFIC GOALS 
Various specific goals are flawed in important ways.  In this part we 
will highlight what seem to us the most important such defects. 
 
A. To Realize the Full Potential of Goal 1, “End poverty in all its forms 
everywhere,” the Goal Should Include Measures of Poverty Other 
than the Income-based Measure of USD 1.25 per Day and Specify 
Structural Reforms that Would Reliably end Poverty.  
 
There is a welcome shift in the proposed agenda’s flagship poverty 
goal from the language of reduction to that of eradication and from the focus 
on poverty and hunger to that of “poverty in all its forms.”  However, no 
measure of poverty, other than the money-metric one of USD 1.25 per day 
(2005 purchasing power) is mentioned.
31
  This income-based measure fails 
to capture many of the hardships that constitute poverty in the real world, 
such as child labor, chronic undernourishment, illiteracy, exposure to 
violence, and lack of access to safe drinking water, shelter, sanitation, 
                                                     
29
 See generally MICRONUTRIENT INITIATIVE, http://micronutrient.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
30
 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 42-43. 
31
 U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, RETHINKING POVERTY: REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL 
SITUATION 2010 at 1, U.N. DOC. ST/ESA/324, U.N. Sales No. E.09.IV.10 (2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2010/fullreport.pdf.  For a review of some of the intricacies 
involved in determining poverty lines, see id. at 50-62. 
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electricity, and essential medicines.
32
  Sidelining these dimensions 
contradicts the language of ending poverty “in all its forms everywhere” in 
the goal’s title. 
Such ambitious language is also undermined by the MOIs associated 
with this goal because they make no reference to structural reforms that 
would contribute to tackling the root causes of poverty.  Structural reforms 
that could be framed as MOIs for this goal should include cancelling the 
external debt of Highly Indebted Poor Countries
33
 and curtailing tax dodging 
opportunities.
34
 
 
B. The Broad Goal 10, “Reduce Inequality Within and Among Countries,” 
Must be Appropriately Specified and Made to Pervade the Entire 
Document.  
 
The stand-alone goal to reduce inequality is an important addition to 
the post-2015 agenda and vital to its success.
35
  It must not be cut from the 
                                                     
32
 “Economic growth does not necessarily translate into improvements in education, health and 
nutrition outcomes.  In other words, high income levels and economic growth acceleration do not by 
themselves guarantee improvements in non-income dimensions of material well-being.”  U.N. DEV. 
PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMANITY DIVIDED: CONFRONTING INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 150 
(2013), available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Humanit
y%20Divided/HumanityDivided_Full-Report.pdf.  Recent efforts have focused on constructing poverty 
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http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globaljustice/The-IDM-Report1.pdf (formulating and defending the 
Individual Deprivation Measure); Individual Deprivation Measure, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, www.iwda.org.au/research/individual-deprivation-measure (last visited Feb. 21, 
2015). 
33
 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR 
COUNTRIES INITIATIVE, https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
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 Press Release, ASAP, UN Goals Should Do More to Curb Tax Dodging that Has Cost Poor 
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framework’s final draft, nor be submerged under some other goal, such as 
poverty eradication or economic growth.  Many opponents of inequality 
reduction maintain that we should be concerned with poverty, not inequality.  
The Economist magazine is especially fond of repeating this thought, for 
example in this classical formulation: “They are quite right, these champions 
of the world’s poor, that poverty in an age of plenty is shameful and 
disgusting.  But they are quite wrong to suppose, as so many of them do, that 
the rich enjoy their privileges at the expense of the poor . . . . Symptomatic 
of this mindset is the widespread and debilitating preoccupation with ‘global 
inequality’.  Whenever the United Nations and its plethora of associated 
agencies opine about the scandal of world poverty, figures on inequality 
always pour forth.”
36
 
To defend a standalone inequality goal against such critique, one can 
appeal to what the objection concedes: that we ought to be concerned with 
severe poverty and deprivations.  Poverty is connected to inequality in two 
ways: mathematically and politically.  The mathematical connection is 
straightforward: other things equal, if the rich have more, the poor must have 
less.  To be sure, the total size of the pie is not strictly fixed.  Humanity can 
bring more land under cultivation, extract more natural resources, increase 
aggregate life stock, and burn more fossil fuel.  But these potential increases 
are limited and they also entail costs that, in the long run, may lead to net 
reductions in the pie.  Given these limits, more for some tends to restrict 
access for others.  There is only so much land on this planet, for instance.  If 
rich people pay for land to be used for playing golf or to produce the beef 
they wish to eat, then this will make land scarcer and more expensive.  This 
in turn will reduce the supply of land for uses essential to poor people, thus 
increasing what the poor must pay for rice, beans, fruits, and vegetables.  
Likewise, the supply of fossil fuels on this planet is finite.  If rich people 
consume massive amounts thereof, then such fuels will become scarcer and 
more expensive.  This in turn will impede poor people’s access to energy 
and will also burden them with the already severe effects of carbon pollution, 
which can be expected to become even more of a burden on the poor in the 
decades to come. 
The mathematical connection can be brought out also in relation to the 
distribution of growth.  There is a limit to the real per capita economic 
growth humanity can sustainably achieve on this planet—maybe 2 percent 
per annum (a little more in the developing world and a little less in the 
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 See Editorial Staff, “A Question of Justice?”, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/2499118. 
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industrialized countries).
37
  With this growth equally distributed, it takes 
thirty-five years for incomes to double in all segments of humanity.  But 
when the share of humanity’s poorer half in global household income 
declines, as it did over the last thirty years, then poverty alleviation proceeds 
even more slowly.  By contrast, if the poorer half’s share in global 
household income could be raised in the SDG period, from currently about 4 
percent to 6 percent perhaps, then the doubling of the per capita income of 
the poorer half would be accomplished much faster: before 2030 already.  
Given the enormous suffering that poverty undeniably causes in terms of 
disease, hunger, homelessness, illiteracy, oppression, dependency, and 
premature deaths,
38
 such an acceleration of poverty eradication would seem 
extremely urgent indeed. 
These thoughts bring us to the political connection between inequality 
and poverty.  The distribution of future growth is heavily influenced by the 
design of national and international economic rules and practices.  Because 
this is well known, such rules and practices are heavily contested by various 
interested parties, such as industry associations, corporations, banks, hedge 
funds, and unions, all of which expend substantial efforts on lobbying for 
rules favorable to themselves.  Such lobbying requires resources, and the 
capacity for successful lobbying is roughly proportional to the resources 
agents can bring to bear.  Even in broadly democratic countries, the poorer 
segments of the population are often politically marginalized when their 
share of national household income is small.  As a result, the social rules 
tend to disfavor these segments, causing them to fall farther and farther 
behind in income, health, education, and social acceptance.
39
  A deliberate 
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effort to design economic rules—both national and global—so as to keep 
inequality within certain bounds can ensure that all human beings have a fair 
opportunity to fend for their interests in the political realm, that societies 
remain fundamentally democratic, and that political pressures toward 
inequality-aggravating rule changes can be resisted. 
Appreciating the importance of the inequality goal, it is all the more 
disheartening to see its point defeated by the grotesque lack of ambition in 
its primary Target 10.1: “By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income 
growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the 
national average.”  This lame target would be achieved even if the income 
share of the poorest 40 percent continued to shrink for the next fourteen 
years—so long as it then began to expand at the very end of the SDG period.  
In view of how enormous inequality has become, globally and in most 
countries, at the very least the demand should be that the income share of the 
poorest 40 percent will be substantially higher at the end of the period than 
at its beginning.  A suitable specification of such a target would be to halve, 
by 2030, each country’s logarithmic distance from a Palma ratio of 1.  The 
Palma ratio is the income share of a population’s richest 10 percent divided 
by that of its poorest 40 percent.
40
  We thus propose that each country should 
aim, by 2030, to reduce income inequality to the square root of its present 
Palma ratio.  Thus, countries with current Palma ratios of 4, 2.25 and 1.69 
would commit to reaching, by 2030, Palma ratios of 2, 1.5 and 1.3, 
respectively.
41
  Countries with current Palma ratios of 1 or below would 
merely need to remain within this range. 
In addition to having its own goal, the concern to avoid excessive 
inequality should also be integrated into the other goals.  Indicators used to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118(1) QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECON. 1 (2003) 
available at http://eml.berkeley.edu//~saez/ (tables and figures updated to 2013). 
40
 See Alex Cobham & Andy Sumner, Is It All About the Tails? The Palma Measure of Income 
Inequality, (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 343, 2013), available at 
www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/it-all-about-tails-palma-measure-income-inequality.pdf (discussing and 
defending the Palma ratio as a fitting measure of inequality); see also Frederico Cingano, Trends in Income 
Inequality and Its Impact on Economic Growth 36 (OECD Soc., Emp’t and Migration Working Papers, No. 
163, 2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxrjncwxv6j-en (Palma ratio data from various 
European countries). 
41
 Let us illustrate with a hypothetical example.  Suppose a country has a Palma ratio of 4, with the 
richest 10% of its population capturing 40% of national household income and the poorest 40% capturing 
only 10%.  To achieve the envisioned Palma ratio of 2, this country might aim to raise the national income 
share of the poorest 40% from 10% to 17% while gradually shrinking the income share of the richest 10% 
from 40% to 34%. At the beginning of the SDG period, the average income of the richest 10% would be 16 
times the average income of the poorest 40%. At the end of the SDG period, the average income of the 
richest 10% would be 8 times the average income of the poorest 40%. The ideal Palma ratio of 1 reflects a 
situation in which the average income of the richest 10% is 4 times the average income of the poorest 40%.    
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monitor targets should be disaggregated by relevant categories such as 
gender, race, ethnicity, religion and geographical area.
42
  In keeping with the 
principle of “leave no one behind,” which was widely endorsed in global 
consultations on the post-2015 agenda,
43
 no target should be considered 
achieved until it has been met for all relevant segments of a population.
44
 
 
C.  To Strengthen Proposed Goal 13, “Take Urgent Action to Combat 
Climate Change and its Impacts,” There Should be One or More 
Targets Aiming to Discourage and Wind Down the Ecologically Most 
Damaging Modes of Production and Consumption; and This Goal 
Should be Related to Other Goals and Their Targets. 
 
The starring role given to the word “sustainable” gives the challenge 
of climate change a much-deserved central place on the agenda; this place is 
confirmed by stand-alone Goal 13.  The moral power of this goal will 
depend, however, on the strength of its targets and the effectiveness of its 
MOIs.  The targets for Goal 13 are, unfortunately, conspicuously weak. 
First, an important target on investing in low-carbon solutions, which 
had appeared in earlier OWG drafts,
45
 was dropped, and the final version 
includes no concrete commitment to mitigate climate change itself.  Now, 
not even one target is devoted to discouraging or ending the ecologically 
most damaging modes of production and consumption, such as coal-fired 
power plants without carbon sequestration, fracking, beef consumption, and 
the awarding of—tax-exempt!—frequent flyer miles.  To be effective, Goal 
13 must single out the most ecologically damaging modes of production and 
consumption and identify targets relating to them.
46
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Second, there is nothing wrong with reiterating in Goal 13 the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s commitment to 
“mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion annually by 2020 . . . to address the 
needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation 
actions.”  But it would have been important to add here that these funds 
should be raised in a way that discourages the burning of fossil fuels.  This 
could be done, for instance, through a global fee on excessive greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.  Each country could be required to pay a fee starting 
at USD 2 per ton in 2016 and then rising by USD 2 annually for each ton of 
CO2 equivalent above a certain threshold—4 tons per capita in 2016 and 
gradually declining thereafter.  This fee would comfortably raise the 
promised USD 100 billion by 2020, and it would also increase the price of 
fossil-fuel based consumption, thereby encouraging both conservation and 
the development of cleaner energy alternatives such as wind, solar, tidal, and 
nuclear. 
Finally, the adaptation targets included under Goal 13 betray a 
technocratic approach to climate change, with only slight token efforts to 
connect this goal to other SDG objectives.  Neither contradictions (with 
goals such as industrialization and economic growth) nor complementarities 
(with goals such as poverty eradication and inequality reduction) are 
sufficiently recognized.  Identifying the dissonance and harmony of Goal 13 
with other goals and their targets is essential to undertaking an honest 
attempt at mitigating climate change and its impacts. 
 
D.  To Give Meaning to Goal 17, “Strengthen the Means of 
Implementation and Revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development,” Concrete Responsibilities Must be Specified for the 
Affluent Countries and International Agencies. 
 
The new global partnership goal proposed by the OWG, Goal 17, is 
intended to be a more robust version of the paltry MDG-8, the only MDG 
that deals directly with the responsibilities of affluent states and international 
agencies.  The absence of measurable targets, indicators, and achieve-by 
dates for MDG-8 indicates that the MDGs were not founded on a ‘global 
partnership’ at all, but were essentially a slate of instructions for the 
developing countries alone.  Goal 17 is certainly more comprehensive than 
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MDG-8, containing nineteen targets on issues such as finance, technology, 
trade, data monitoring, and accountability. 
Nonetheless, the key defect of MDG-8 also mars Goal 17.  The 
world’s most powerful agents―affluent states, international organizations, 
and multinational enterprises―will once again be shielded from any 
concrete responsibilities for achieving the development goals when, given 
their wealth and influence, they ought to be taking the lead in providing the 
needed resources and in implementing systemic institutional reforms 
addressing the root causes of poverty.  These needed reforms include 
changing the rules that encourage illicit financial outflows from developing 
countries or force the poorest countries to pay interest on debts accumulated 
by previous corrupt and often unelected leaders.  Instead, we are treated to 
rather banal language on the need for “multi-stakeholder partnerships” with 
private actors and civil society.  If Goal 17 fails to hold the world’s most 
influential agents sufficiently accountable for what they owe toward making 
sustainable development work, the concepts of partnership and universalism 
remain a smokescreen for extreme global inequalities, thus weakening 
confidence in the goals. 
A strong global partnership goal is essential for maintaining the moral 
authority of the post-2015 agenda as a whole.  The targets for Goal 17 
should be re-written to specify the concrete responsibilities of the affluent 
states in regard to implementing needed global institutional reforms and 
financing sustainable development.  Responsibilities of these two kinds can 
often be discharged through a single institutional mechanism.  For example, 
to deter and offset the effects of protectionist barriers—which distort trade 
and diminish trading opportunities for poor populations—rich countries 
providing subsidies or export credits might commit to paying a share of the 
value of such subventions into a Human Development Fund.
47
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is good that the SDGs and the debate surrounding them have 
focused attention on development and on the immense deprivations still 
inflicted upon the poorer half of humanity.  Eradicating these deprivations as 
quickly as we reasonably can is a moral imperative of the highest order.  
This article highlights the most important changes in the SDG draft—and in 
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 This share might be 2% in 2016 and then increase by another 2% each year, reaching 30% in 2030.  
At today’s level of subsidies and export credits, this mechanism would raise between USD 6 billion (2016) 
and USD 90 billion (2030) a year over the SDG period.  For comparison, current official development 
assistance stands at USD 130 billion from all countries. 
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the prevailing intellectual and practical approaches to poverty eradication—
that are necessary for humanity to comply with this moral imperative.  
Responsibilities for achieving the SDGs must be clearly assigned to 
competent agents, specifying their respective roles and efforts.  Definitions 
and measurement methods must be fixed in advance and progress be tracked 
by groups of independent experts.  Here the SDGs should recognize as 
paramount the goal that all human beings have secure access to all their 
human rights.  Doing so requires replacing the absurdly restrictive 
definitions of extreme poverty (World Bank) and chronic undernourishment 
(FAO).  The SDGs should also set out a clear and accessible measure of 
inequality (such as the Palma ratio) for tracking progress.  And they should, 
wherever possible, focus attention on structural reforms on the national and 
supranational levels so as to eradicate the systemic causes for the persistence 
of severe poverty.  These improvements in the current draft are minimally 
necessary if the SDGs are to be not merely a propaganda exercise but a 
serious plan for the final eradication of poverty. 
